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EDUCATION FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT:
REASSESSING THE ROLE OF THE
PUBLIC SCHOOL IN A DEMOCRACY
Charles R Lawrence III*
COMPELLING BELIEF:

THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN SCHOOLING.

By Stephen Arons. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1983. Pp.
xi, 221. $19.95.
Every government degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the people
alone. The people themselves therefore are its only safe depositories. . . . An amendment of our constitution must here come in aid of
the public education. The influence over government must be shared
among all the people. If every individual which composes their mass
participates of the ultimate authority, the government will be safe; because the corrupting the whole mass will exceed any private resources
of wealth . . . . 1

Thomas Jefferson's vision of public education as a custodian of
democracy survives at the core of what most Americans believe
about public schools. Most of us were educated in public schools.
We believe that public schools provide the best opportunity for most
Americans to learn the skills and responsibilities of citizenship. An
attack on public schools is often viewed as an attack on democracy.
Stephen Arons' book, Compelling Belief, is a forceful and provocative <;;hallenge to the ideology of public schooling. While Jefferson
saw the public schools functioning as a guardian against the tyranny
of political elites, Arons describes a system that suppresses dissent,
cannibalizes culture and threatens the vitality of the democratic
process.
Arons' thesis is a radical one. He argues that the present political
and financial structure of American schooling is unconstitutional.
His argument is straightforward: (1) The rights of freedom of speech
and freedom of the press protected by the first amendment include
"the right to read, and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought [and]
freedom to teach. . ." (p. 200).2 (2) Schooling inevitably involves the
* Visiting Professor of Law, Stanford University. Professor of Law, University of San
Francisco. B.A. 1965, Haverford College; J.D. 1969, Yale University. Professor Lawrence is
the coauthor (with Joel Dreyfuss) of THE BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY (1979).
-Ed.
l. T. Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, in 4 WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 64-65 (Federal ed.
1904) (Jefferson's explanation of his "Bill For The More General Diffusion of Knowledge").
2. Quoting Justice Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). This
view is not a novel one and Arons notes that it has been advanced by such noted authors as
810
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transmission of values or the establishment of some beliefs or world
views and the stigmatization of others.3 (3) Schooling is compulsory.
The state operates the public schools and only those families with
sufficient :financial resources are free to choose non-public schooling.
When these non-public alternatives threaten majoritarian values
they are extensively regulated (pp. 85-185). (4) This constitutes government control of content in the education of a captive audience
and thereby violates the first amendment.4
A central purpose of the first amendment is the protection of the
vitality of a political process that relies upon the informed consent of
the governed for its legitimacy. But there can be no consent, Arons
argues, where the governed are subject to involuntary governmental
manipulation of consciousness:
The society that utilizes the institutional power of involuntary schooling to reduce an individual's control over the development of personal
conscience and consciousness threatens to make that individual politically impotent. Under these conditions the government be'?(>mes a
kind of political perpetual-motion machine, legitimizing its long-term
policies through the world view and public opinion it creates. [P. 203].
Arons' thesis is grounded in constitutional theory, but Compelling
Belief is happily a book that reaches beyond first amendment· doc-

trine to explore the human feelings and social dynamics that are the
flesh and bones of first amendment conflicts. In a series of case studies, constructed from interviews with parents, school officials and
their lawyers, Arons examines a variety of disputes involving the
censorship of curriculum in American schools and analyzes the legal
and political implications of these disputes over what children shall
be taught. This approach to the analysis of an abstract legal principle, by exploring the perceptions and feelings of those who are directly affected, maintains an engagement with reality often absent in
Thomas Emerson, p. 201, and Alexander Meiklejohn, p. 202. The Supreme Court has long
recognized that the first amendment embraces the freedom to teach. See, e.g., Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249-50
(1957). Recent case law has also acknowledged a first amendment right to acquire information. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
3. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the public schools are ''vitally important
. , . vehicles for 'inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system.'" Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. at 864 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
4. For a contrasting view see, J. TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND 51-85 (1977)
arguing that the state has an important "teaching power'' that involves inducting children into
the co=unity and that makes such notions as children's free speech or state ideological neutrality irrelevant. See also Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case
Against Judicial Intervention, 59 TEX. L. REv. 477 (1981); Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right ofPublic School Teachers to .Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1293
(1976).
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conventional constitutional scholarship, where the appellate opinion
is used as the point of departure.
Arons' case analysis is divided into three parts which introduce
variations on two central themes. The themes are not hopeful. The
first is a saga of "corrosive, irreconcilable, and proliferating conflict"
(p. vii) among fearful parents who find their children growing up
"amidst a rubble of collapsed cultural meanings and dysfunctional
social values" (p. viii). Arons notes that "up to 30 percent of the
nation's school districts have experienced book and curriculum conflicts in the past few years ..." (p. 14). He describes the public
burning of books in Warsaw, Indiana, the banning of Solzhenitsyn
in Maine, and of Malamud and Langston Hughes in Levittown, New
York.
Maurice Sendak's four-year-old character Mickey must wear Magic
Marker shorts in.In the Night Kitchen lest the kin.dergartners of Spring.field, Missouri, be corrupted. The texts of Oregon must not cast aspersions on the Founding Fathers, and those of Louisiana must teach the
benefits of free-enterprise economics. Sex-role stereotypes must be removed from books in Montgomery County, Maryland; the juniorhigh-school children in one district of New York City may not read
about life in Spanish Harlem; books are screened for racial sterotypes
and Huck Finn is .finished in Winnetka, Illinois. The legislature of
Arkansas insists that Genesis be given equal time with evolution;
whole dictionaries are banned because they contain multiple definitions for "bed," "knock," and "shack." [P. 15].

Arons argues that today's school censorship wars, like the wars over
state religions fought in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
represent an attempt to "transform private values into public orthodoxy" (p. 193). The censorship epidemic is a symptom of societal
malaise. Parents who experience deep value conflict or uncertainty
seek "to impose meaning on social order and, in the process, to define personal identity" (p. 21). The public schools have historically
been viewed as a remedial source of social cohesion, and have become a natural vehicle for these efforts at achieving personal salvation by invoking the power of the state to coerce the beliefs of
others.5
The causal connection between parents' search for personal identity and the school censorship battles in which they engage makes
religious warfare a particularly appropriate analogue. It is the inten5. Arons notes that this vision of the public school as a vehicle for social cohesion through
coerced socialization or value inculcation is an essential element of a public school ideology
that envisions that it is "possible, desirable, and even essential to prescribe a system of values
that is best for everyone." P. 123. For a historical review of the ideology supporting compulsory schooling, see Everhart, From Universalism to Usurpation: An Essay on the Antecedents to
Compulsory School Attendance Legislation, 41 REv. Eouc. RESEARCH 499 (1977). See also M.
KATZ, THE IRONY OF EARLY SCHOOL REFORM (1968); D. NASAW, SCHOOLED TO ORDER
(1979); D. TYACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM (1974).
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sity of emotion that accompanies conflict over religious- or ideological values that leads Arons to conclude that such disputes are
"irreconcilable"6 and can only result in the debilitating polarization
and factionalism that the framers of the Constitution sought to avoid
by forbidding state-sponsored religion.
Arons' solution is to pursue the analogy to its logical conclusion.
The first amendment establishment clause's prohibition against the
state inculcation of relgious beliefs7 should be extended to secular
ideologies as well. Because education cannot be value neutral the
government must be excluded from the business of education. 8
Arons' approach is especially attractive when one considers the
confusion and incoherence of the Supreme Court's most recent decision concerning school censorship, Board ofEducation v. Pico .9 The
Justices' several opinions make apparent the difficulty of providing a
coherent standard for resolving school censorship disputes without
directly confronting and resolving the contradiction between the
government control of compulsory schooling and intellectual
freedom. 10
The justices are unanimous in their acceptance of the indoctrinative function of the public schools. But the existence of constitutional limits upon the power of the state to control speech in
schoolrooms or usurp the family's role in the socialization of children is equally clear. 11 Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of the
Court, finds himself on the horns of a dilemma, the resolution of
which requires the creation of several distinctions of dubious sub6. Arons does not believe that all conflict over world views and beliefs is necessarily irreconcilable. On at least two occasions he refers to the possibility of the constructive use of conflict, pp. x, 132, but in each instance he gives little attention to the possibility. He indicates that
while techniques such as mediation are likely to be more successful than court proceedings in
resolving these disputes, he is not sanguine about its capabilities where attitudes and world
views concerning who should control a child's education are involved.
7. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
8. Arons argues for the ultimate extension of Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925), which, in invalidating an Oregon statute requiring all children to attend public schools,
noted that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State," 268 U.S. at 535, and ruled that the
Constitution's fundamental theory of liberty "excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only." 268 U.S.
at 535. See Arons, Separation ofSchool and State: Pierce Reconsidered, 46 HARV. Eouc. R.E.v.
76 (1976).
9. 457 u.s 853 (1982).
10. By a 5 to 4 vote the Court refused to dismiss the students' first amendment claims and
remanded them for trial. But of the five justices voting to remand, only three, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, could fully join in an opinion; Blackmun joined in part of the plurality
opinion but wrote a separate concurrence and White concurred in the judgment, stating that a
trial was needed to develop the factual record. Justices Burger, Powell, Rehnquist and
O'Connor dissented.
11. 457 U.S. 853 at 864-65 (citing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943), Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), and Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969)).
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stance. Brennan says that the Court is not intruding "upon [the]
school board's discretion to prescribe curricula" because the library
books at issue in this case are "optional rather than required reading."12 He then argues that it is significant that this case involves the
removal of books from the library and not a decision about what
books should be acquired. 13 Finally, Justice Brennan stresses the
distinction between a curricular decision that is politically or morally
motivated and a decision that is "based solely upon the 'educational
suitability' of the books in question." 14
It is far from clear why library reading is protected by the first
amendment when it is voluntary but would not be if made a required part of the curriculum. Likewise the removal/acquisition distinction seems a difference too easily subject to formalistic
manipulation to survive serious substantive scrutiny. Would the Island Trees School Board have acted constitutionally if it had required that each student read a selection of books from the library or
if it had sold the entire library collection and then reacquired all but
the ten books in question?
Initially,· the distinction between "political" and "educational''
motives seems more authentic. Censorship that is justified by characterizing the censored material as "anti-American, anti-Christian,
anti-Sem[i]tic and just plain filthy" 15 obviously violates the first
amendment's prescription against the regulation of political speech
based on its content. And civil libertarians are less offended when
the same decision is couched in the more neutral sounding professional educators' jargon of "suitability," "relevance" and "appropriateness to age and grade level." 16 But if the transmission of values is
an appropriate educational task, the "educational suitability" of a
book may be determined at least in part by its political content. The
school board's determination that a book is inappropriate for a grade
12. 457 U.S. at 862.
13. 457 U.S. at 862.
14. Thus whether petitioners' removal of books.from their school libraries denied respon-

dents their First Amendment rights depends upon the motivation behindpetitioners' actions.

Ifpetitioners intended by their removal decision to deny respondents access to ideas with
which petitioners disagreed, and if this intent was the decisive factor in petitioners' decision, then petitioners have exercised their discretion in violation of the Constitution. . . .
On the other hand, respondents implicitly concede that an unconstitutional motivation
would not be demonstrated if it were shown that petitioners had decided to remove the
books at issue because those books were pervasively vulgar... [or] if it were demonstrated that the removal decision was based solely upon the "educational suitability" of
the books in question . . .
457 U.S. at 871 (footnote omitted).
15. When the Island Trees Union School Board removed the books from the library
shelves it issued a press release so characterizing the removed books. 457 U.S. at 857.
16. The Board appointed a book review committee and instructed the co=ittee to make
its reco=endations based on "educational suitability," "good taste," "relevance," and "ap•
propriateness to age and grade level.'' The committee's reco=endations were substantially
rejected by the Board without any statement of reasons for doing so. 457 U.S. at 857-58.
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level may be based on moral judgments about if or when children
should be exposed to certain kinds of material.
Arons identifies two additional problems with the plurality's attempt to limit the Pico decision to those cases in which the censor's
intent is to impose a recognizable political or moral point of view
upon the school. The first is the difficulty of providing a legally satisfactory standard for determining when a prohibited public school
orthodoxy exists.
[J]udges have indicated that they want to know exactly what is-being
forced down students' throats before the law will acknowledge the
right of free inquiry . . . but these beliefs are rarely systematically organized or easy to identify or articulate . . . . Antifeminism, for example, can be seen running through the efforts of many censors, yet
proving that these people are seeking to impose a monolithic view of
human relationships is extremely difficult . . . . [Pp. 70-71].

A second problem in applying this approach is that the political
censorship in most public schools is a negative one: "When the prevailing orthodoxy consists of learning to be superficial and unresponsive and to live a bureaucraticized life without rebelling, it is. no
wonder that judges ask for, and civil-liberties lawyers cannot really
provide, a capsule definition of the dominant ethic of schools or censors" (p. 71).
There is much that is appealing in an anti-establishment doctrine
that applies to political as well as religious indoctrination. It is a
clearer and more easily applied standard and is consistent with first
amendment doctrine regarding the regulation of speech. But if the
remedy for the unconstitutionality of government schools is the
privatization of education, it becomes less clear that we have discov:ered a counterweight to the deadening - forces of prevailing
orthodoxy.
Even if we imagine the best of circumstances, where the schools
are run by well-informed and caring groups of parents rather than
IBM or Sears, those who control the school will impose their own
brand of truth and justice on the children in their charge. But the
absence of government involvement in this censorship and the theoretical availability of alternative forums for learning will bar any
first amendment claims. Legitimate conflict will only exist where
those seeking the power of indoctrination within a private institution
are relatively evenly matched, and once one side has been held the
victor others will not have cause to complain.
There may be much virtue in maintaining an arena where ideological conflict is perceived to be legitimate. Later in the book Arons
recognizes the importance of school disputes as a forum for more
broad-based social criticism. Having catalogued the most often
heard complaints about public schools, he reminds us that "the perceived orthodoxy these families oppose is characteristic not simply of
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schools but of the culture in general" (p. 101). Moreover, despite the
efforts of public school bureaucrats to exclude parents from their
professional turf, parents continue to organize to regain control of
the schools. The fact that their children's consciousness is at stake
legitimizes their struggle as does their feeling that they understand
what their children need as well as anyone. When the schools are
public, and at least theoretically subject to their governance, their
involvement is further legitimized. 17 Perhaps we should hesitate
before abolishing one of the only remaining fora where public debate is viewed as legitimate and accessible to common people. 18
Arons never explicitly advocates the substitution of privately
controlled schools for the present public system, 19 but such a result is
necessarily implied in his first amendment analysis. It is an implication that bears further exploration because there is substantial danger that an apparent antidote for the disease of coerced orthodoxy
may, in fact, advance the malignancy. If Arons is correct that value
neutrality in education is impossible, the incoherence of the Pico decision should convince us that he is also right that government control of compulsory education and the first amendment's prohibition
against established ideology are irreconcilable. But a solution that
requires the substitution of schools controlled by the private sector
relies upon a formalistic constitutional distinction between public
and private that may simply disguise the wolf of government coercion in sheep's clothing. By framing his social/political analysis
within first amendment doctrine Arons incurs the danger of unintentionally incorporating all of the ideological baggage of that doctrine
and in so doing advancing the very cancer it is his purpose to cure.
Several critical commentators have described the process by
which law has been made a vehicle for the transmission of ideological imagery that helps to preserve and legitimize existing power relationships.20 The legal system is used by those in power to achieve
17. See generally P. Gabel, The Mass Psychology of the New Federalism: How the Burger
Court's Political Imagery Legitimizes the Privatization of Everyday Life (March 1982) (paper
presented at conference on critical legal studies) (arguing that the role of law in maintaining
the power of elites is to be found not in the direct practical consequences of its decisions with the politics of these outcomes being mystified by ideology - but rather in the ideology
itself as a set of cultural images that are intended to give a false political legitimacy to the
existing social order).
18. Arons recognizes the function that public schools serve as a forum for debate oflarger
societal issues. "School conflict is a microcosm of social stress because schooling is accessible
politics. Conflict over schooling is visible, local, and more nearly legible than any other aspect
of public policy debate." P. 90.
19. Arons does include a critical assessment of a District of Columbia "tax credit" plan
that was defeated by the voters in 1981, pp. 215-21, but he makes clear that it is not the book's
purpose to make or comment upon specific proposals for increased choice in education. P. 214.
20. See, e.g., D. HAY, P. LINEBAUGH, J. RULE, E.P. THOMPSON & C. WINSLOW, ALBION'S
FATAL TREE (1975); Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Ant/discrimination
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978); Gabel &
Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE PoLmcs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 172
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results in individual legal disputes that maintain the status quo.
What is less obvious, but perhaps more important, is the use of legal
ideas as a means of creating and transmitting utopian images that
serve to justify that status quo. By representing reality in ideal terms
the law validates the socio-economic context in which legal decisions
are made. The ideological imagery masks or denies the reality of
oppressive or alienating social or economic relations and persuades
us that they are fair. 21
Recent developments in first amendment law involve just such a
distorting ideological representation. In Buckley v. Valeo 22 and First
National Bank of Boston v. Be//otti23 the Supreme Court invalidated
attempts to mitigate the effects of concentrated wealth on state and
federal elections. The Court held that a congressional statute limiting campaign expenditures and a Massachusetts statute barring the
use of corporate funds to influence the outcomes of referenda violated the first amendment.24 This extension of the first amendment's
protection to corporations and wealthy politicians contains the ideal
image of a shared interest in free speech between the wealthy and
society as a whole. The ideal image of equal access to the marketplace of ideas, or those social and political fora where our ideas may
gain acceptance is substituted for the reality of a mass media and
electoral process that is dominated by the wealthy.
Private schools are free to engage in religious and ideological indoctrination because the Constitution only prohibits governmental
abridgement of speech.25 In the absence of state action the courts
(D. Kairys ed. 1982) (reviewed in this issue); Gordon, New .Developments in Legal Theory, in
id., at 281; Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 205
(1979); Lawrence, "Justice" or "Just Us'~· Racism and the Role of Ideology (Book Review), 35
STAN. L. REV. 831 (1983).
21. Professors Peter Gabel and Jay Feinman have noted, for example, that in the nineteenth century the law of contracts generated a new ideological imagery that helped persuade
workers to accept the social dislocation, alienation, and class domination embodied in the
Industrial Revolution:
The legitimatizing image of classical contract law . . . was the ideal of free competition as
the consequence of wholly voluntary interactions among many private persons, all of
whom were in their nature free and equal to one another. . . . It did not take account of
the practical limitations on market freedom and equality arising from class position or
unequal distribution of wealth. . . . The legitimation of the free market was achieved by
seizing upon a narrow economic notion of freedom and equality, and fusing it in the
public mind with the genuine meaning.
See Gabel & Feinman, supra note 20, at 176.
22. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
23. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
24. In Bellotti the Court held that the principle of nondiscrimination among speakers dic-

tates that "speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the First Amendment [does
not lose) that protection simply because its source is a corporation . . . ." 435 U.S. at 784. In
Buckley the rule that speech may not be deliberately suppressed was transformed into the
more abstract proposition that the quantity of speech may not be deliberately reduced. Therefore, campaign expenditures may not be limited by Congress.
25. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV,§ 1. See also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The
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will not hear the free speech claim of a child or her family who complains of school censorship.26 Furthermore, the school itself has first
amendment rights. 27 It is this affirmative right to institutional free
speech28 that contains the seeds of ideological illusion.29 If we accept the imagery that posits a community where all private individuals and institutions have roughly equal access to the resources
required to make themselves heard, we are likely to be persuaded
that intellectual freedom requires first amendment protection for private school indoctrination whether those schools are run by the local
church or Xerox Corporation.
Because Compelling Belief focuses on the problems created by
value inculcation in government run and regulated schools we may
lose sight of the fact that powerful private institutions play at least as
significant a role in the manipulation of public consciousness. The
average American child spends about 1000 hours in school each
year, but the same child also spends in excess of 1300 hours per year
in front of the television.30 With the advent of cable television it
becomes increasingly apparent that the mass media and the corporate sponsors who pay its bills are a far greater danger to pluralistic
thought than the public schools.31
·
In Parts Two and Three Arons examines the experience of two
groups of individuals who have sought to escape the orthodoxy of
the public schools. The home education movement and the rapid
limitations of the state action doctrine appear to make a great deal of sense in this circumstance. In addition to the generally applicable concern for diluting judicial legitimacy through
indiscriminate constitutional intervention, see, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 128 (1962); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIOH'I1
50-53 (1975), one might weU argue in this instance that the opportunity for school choice or
alternative forums for learning and expression precludes a right to free speech in a particular
private schooL
26. Cf. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
27. "Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated consitutional right, long has
been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978); see also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957),
28. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
29. It should be noted that the state action limitation contains similar ideological imagery,
For a discussion of this phenomenon see Lawrence, supra note 20, at 847-48. See also Olsen,
17ze Family and the Market: A Study ofIdeology and Legal Rifonn, 96 HARV, L. REv. 1497
(1983); Brest, State Action and Liberal 17zeory: A Case Note on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130
U. PA. L. REv. 1296 (1982).
30. "[S]tudies show the average American child (age 9 to 12) will spend about 1,000 hours
in classrooms over the course of a year, but 1,340 hours in front of a television set. And by the
time that child completes high school, he will have spent 22,000 hours of accumulated viewing
time before the television screen and only 11,000 hours of classroom time." Today's Children
Listen More To TV 17zan Teachers, Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 17, 1983, at 6, col. I,
31. It will be argued that television's role in consciousness manipulation is distinguishable
from that of the schools in that one is not compelled to watch television. But this argument
begs the question. Just as Arons has noted that only those with the requisite financial resources have true choice in schooling, television is for many the only real accessible and affordable source of public information and entertainment.

February 1984]

Education for Se!f-Government

819

growth of fundamentalist schools are contrasting responses of families who "sense that the assumptions of the majority culture have lost
their power of explanation . . ." (p. 192). Arons finds that both of
these groups of dissenters face governmental resistance and regulation that is far out of proportion to the threat which they might pose
to either the public school system or the children involved. We learn
that when parents choose to educate their children at home they may
be convicted of criminal violations, charged with neglect, separated
from their children, forced to move out of state, or jailed. When
Christian Academies in Kentucky refused to comply with a complex
and detailed set of state regulations the state board ordered local
school officials to enforce the truancy laws against parents of children attending those schools and threatened to bring actions against
the principals and teachers for "unlawful transaction with a minor"
(p. 158). ''Why is it that millions of children who are pushouts or
dropouts amount to business as usual in the public schools," Arons
asks, "while one family educating a child at home becomes a major
threat to universal public education . . ." (p. 88)? "In none of these
cases did anyone seriously question the health or happiness of the
children or suggest they were being abused or neglected in any way
other than in their parents' failure to send them to schools most people attend" (p. 89). Arons identifies the unifying element in these
cases as government hostility to dissent (p. 191). He describes a government bureaucracy that is not so much fearful of a particular segment of the political spectrum (religious fundamentalists and
counterculture hippies alike are repressed), as they are of the fact
that these families have actively rejected the public school ideology
that the majority culture represents the best answer for all. Again
Arons' concern is not simply with the personal price which individual dissenting families must pay but with the damage done to the
political process.
The problem for the society at large is that by repressing dissenting
values, seeds of future consensus and social cohesion are destroyed.
Especially in matters of child rearing and school socialization, the repression of dissenting values is a method of cannibalizing culture. [P.
196].

Arons concludes his discussion with a brief evaluation of one of
the more widely discussed proposals for increasing family choice in
education, the tuition tax credit plan.32 In concluding that a recently
defeated Washington, D.C. initiative "must be regarded as unsatisfactory and counterproductive" (p. 216), Arons identifies three
32. Arons analyzes the "Greater Educational Opportunities Through Tax Incentives" initiative. P. 216. Washington, D.C. voters defeated this initiative by a two-to-one majority on
November 3, 1981. Arons' discussion remains timely. A similar plan is being circulated in
California as a proposed state constitutional amendment, and President Reagan has supported
a federal tax credit plan.
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broad questions that must be addressed in evaluating any proposed
restructuring of American education:
1. Would the new structure remove economic discrimination in the
choice of schools and prevent some families from pricing others completely out of the market, thereby becoming truly voluntary for families complying with compulsory education requirements?
2. Would the new structure provide a clear and enforceable policy
that race discrimination in any form and in any aspect of schooling is
illegal?
3. Would the new structure protect individuals, families, and schools
from government manipulation of beliefs and world views? Is the direct or indirect regulation of family choice or school content prohibited
except where compelling justifications exist? [P. 220].

Arons clearly recognizes the enormous pragmatic difficulties of
fashioning a plan that merits an affirmative answer to the first two
questions and remains politically viable.33 His third question raises
theoretical problems as well. If individuals, families, and private
schools are to be protected from government manipulation of beliefs
except where compelling justifications exist, we must determine what
constitutes a "compelling justification." Are there valu~s or beliefs
that are of sufficient import to or impact upon society to justify coerced consensus?
Arons directly confronts the conflict between individual liberty
and racial equality. The achievement of racial equality in all aspects
of schooling is, for him, the clearest case of a "compelling interest of
overwhelming importance" (p. 218).34 But if it is clear_ that a claim
to first amendment protection of religious or political belief will not
prevail against government enforcement of racial equality in access
to education, what is the correct result when racism is part of the
explicit or implicit curriculum or is officially condoned among a student's peers? Should the result be different when schools exclude
women, or teach female children that they are less worthy or able
than their brothers or that they should aspire only to traditional women's roles? 35
33. See Arons & Lawrence, 17ze Manipulation of Consciousness: A First Amendment Critique of Schooling, 15 HAR.v. C.R.-C.L. L. R.Ev. 309, 341-59 (1980).
34. Despite his concern for government value coercion that is achieved through overregulation of private schools, pp. 137-85, Arons favors clear and enforceable regulation of racial
discrimination in schools; including, for example, the determination of whether testing, tracking, disciplinary policies or admissions policies are racially discriminatory. See p. 218 (discussing the D.C. tax credit plan). See also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017
(1983), where the Court held that private religious schools with racially discriminatory policies
could be denied tax exemption by the I.R.S. because the governmental interest in eliminating
racial discrimination in education was compelling and substantially outweighed whatever burden denial of tax benefits placed on the petitioner's exercise of their religious beliefs. For a
provocative discussion supporting the result reached in Bob Jones University and offering a
constitutional rationale therefor see, Bell, What Color Was Jesus? Religious Freedom and Racial Justice in Modem America, - TEX. L.R.Ev. - (1983).
35. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976), which
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But these questions merely restate the ever present dilemma of
how one makes liberty and equality compatible. Arons has taken a
first and important step in leading us to a more explicit examination
of the liberties to be weighed in the balance.
There is, however, another important question that must be
asked. That is, what is the role of the state in protecting the interests
of the child vis a vis the child's parents? 36 By focusing his analysis on
the relationship between the government and the family, Arons
avoids addressing the intra-familial conflicts which may exist when
parental values and children's interests diverge. Arons does acknowledge that "there are families in which the children dissent
from parents' decision(s)" and "children who do not accept the substance of what their parents seek to indoctrinate in them" (p. 98).
But having noted the importance and intractability of the problem of
conflict within families he suggests that its resolution must await another day. 37 It is understandable that the author should choose to
defer discussion of a set of issues that would merit an additional
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex by covered educational institutions contains specific exemptions for religious institutions and undergraduate colleges which have always been
single sex institutions. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 168l(a)(3), (5) (1976). The Statute does not include
coverage for discriminatory curriculum materials. See also Vorcheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (upholding the constitutionality of a sex-segregated secondary
school). But see Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); cf. Olsen, supra
note 29. Frances Olsen has argued that the ideology which posits the family as a private
sphere which should remain immune from state intervention ignores the fact ~at the state has
traditionally ratified the social roles assigned to family members (for example, that parents are
decisionmakers and disciplinarians or that women should be subservient to their husbands).
"The notion of noninterference in the family depends upon some shared conception of proper
family roles, and 'neutrality' can be understood only with reference to such roles." 96 HAR.v.
L. REV. at 1506. Thus when we invoke familial liberty to preserve the right of the family
patriarch to send his daughter to a school that teaches her that she should not aspire to be a
nuclear physicist, we may actually be preserving a status quo born of an earlier state
intervention.
36. This question is distinct from the question of whether the state has interests in promoting collective values unrelated to the well-being of the individual child. In Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), for example, the court concluded that the interests served by Wisconsin's compulsory education law (those of preparing citizens for effective, intelligent and
self-reliant political and social partipation), were ably served by the training and support provided in the co=unity life of the Old Order Amish who withdrew their children from school
after the first eight grades. While the court indicated that it would not permit the state to
impose its idea of the "best possible life" as a justification for intrusion on religious freedoms,
it never directly considered the interests of the children themselves in developing independent
lifestyles or pursuing options at odds with the views and aspirations of their families. As Justice Douglas observed in dissent, allowing the Amish parents a religious exemption operated
"to impose the parents' notions of religious duty upon their children." 406 U.S. at 242 (dissenting in part).
37. To explore the complexities of the relationship between child and parent in home
schooling; to plumb the psychology of rebellion, coercion, growth, and autonomy within
these families; to relate these family patterns to a pragmatic theory of children's rights and
the role of family in society would require another research project altogether. It will
have to suffice here to observe that the rights of children in families will probably be
easier to understand and protect once the consequences of overbearing state pressures on
the families themselves have been articulated.
Pp. 98-99.
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book, but in this case the postponement of consideration results in
the omission of an important step in Arons' first amendment
analysis.
The state historically played a minimal role in protecting children, but that role has gradually increased.38 Today we view the
government as having significant responsibility for the protection of
minors, even from their parents. 39 Any attempt to strike the appropriate balance between familial liberty and the governmental interest
in the coerced imposition of collective values on families must consider the state's interest in protecting the children within those
families.
The conflict between parental liberty and the state's role in safeguarding the well-being of minors is most directly presented in the
literature that has examined laws providing for state intervention on
behalf of abused and neglected children.40 Here there is also a preference for family autonomy as against state intervention, but the determination of the best interest of the child remains a critical, if not
the primary, inquiry.41 Children clearly have important interests, the
parental abrogation of which would not amount to abuse or neglect.
For example, a child has an interest in being exposed to the kind of
information, experiences and adult support that will enable him or
her to grow into a mature, responsible and independent adult. The
child's interest in ·eventual adult autonomy may require an ability to
exercise options which his or her parents would consider morally
foreclosed. The failure of parents to provide their children with an
education that maximizes their future independence would hardly
warrant the severe state intrusion involved in removing a child from
parental custody. But the same interest might justify the more limited coercive intervention of government-regulated compulsory
schooling.
38. For a good historical overview see Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A
Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 894-917
(1975).
39. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1943). See also S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS
FAIL (1971); R. KEMPE & C.H. KEMPE, CHILD ABUSE (1978); Areen, supra note 38.
40. See ]. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1979); ]. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1973); Crouch, An Essay on the Critical and Judicial Reception of Beyond the Best
Interests of the Child, 13 FAM. L.Q. 49 (1979); Mnookin, Foster Care: In Whose Best Interests?,
43 HAR.v. EDUC. REv. 599 (1973), reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 158 (Harv. Educ.
Rev. ed. 1974); Wald, State Intervention on Dehoff of "Neglected" Children: Standards for
Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and
Tennination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 625 (1976); Wald, Thinking About Public
Policy Toward Abuse and Neglect of Children: A Review of Before the Best Interests of the
Child (Book Review), 78 MICH. L. REv. 645 (1980); Symposium, The Relationship Between
Promise and Perfannance in State Intervention in Family Life, 9 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 28
(1972).
41. See notes 39-40 supra.
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One might ask, for example, whether the state has an interest in
insuring that adolescent children receive sufficient instruction in sex
education to make intelligent choices about their sexual behavior.
One could ask further whether this interest overrides the liberty of
parents who do not believe their children should receive such information. Will the state's interest in requiring a curriculum that does
not confine young women to learning stereotyped roles and skills be
viewed as compelling if its goal is protecting the emotional health
and future options of girls whose parents' values would restrict their
development as full human beings?
The answers to these questions are far from obvious. What is
clear is that they must be asked and that Arons' constitutional analysis remains incomplete by their omission.
Compelling Belief is at its best in conveying the intensity and
complexity of emotion that surrounds our individual and collective
struggle to give our lives meaning through the lives of our children.
One wishes for more of Arons' sensitive reportage and compelling
narrative. If the book has a weakness it lies in the author's attempt
to find an answer to the complexity he observes in the formalism of
conventional constitutional doctrine. But perhaps this is only to
fault the craftsman for the bluntness of the tools that the law has
provided him.
Compelling Belief challenges us to evaluate our assumptions
about the role of schooling in the preservation of the democratic process. The high priests of public education are certain to complain
that this book attacks one of the last bastions of democracy. But
those who share Jefferson's concern that the mass of people should
continue to control their own destinies42 would do well to accept Arons' challenge to examine critically how our schools can best serve
the dual purpose of instilling shared community values and promoting the diversity of thought that vitalizes the process by which we
determine what values we share.

42. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.

